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Introduction 
Comparative analyses of unionization and industrial relations systems sometimes liken 
the Italian case to a more or less well-defined southern European (Ebbinghaus, 2003) 
or Mediterranean model, which combines an ideologically-based division among the 
peak organizations, organizational fragmentation and weakness, low levels of mem-
bership, limited recognition by the counterparties, an adversarial logic of action, and a 
low (or at any rate unstable and unpredictable) ability to influence regulation of the 
economy. Because of one or more of these features, Italy is often grouped together 
with Spain, Portugal, Greece, and also France.  
But to what extent is this characterization appropriate?  
It is indubitable, in fact, that since their reconstruction in 1944, the Italian trade 
unions have been divided along ideological lines; that unlike trade unions in the Nor-
dic countries, they have not reached particularly high levels of membership; that dif-
ferently from trade unions in many corporatist systems (Ebbinghaus & Visser, 1999; 
Schmitt & Mitukiewicz, 2012), they have not received formal recognition from gov-
ernments and employers; that they have generally resorted to conflict much more fre-
quently than unions in the other developed countries (Franzosi, 1995; Bordogna, 
2010); and that they have been often viewed as organizationally weak, in that they for 
long relied on political backing and lacked the organizational infrastructure neces-
sary for decentralized collective bargaining (Lange et al., 1982; Baccaro & Pulignano, 
2010). Yet empirical analyses show that the outcomes of effective action by the Italian 
trade unions, as regards their capacity both to acquire followings and to influence the 
decisions of their public and private counterparts, have proved very different from 
those that one would have expected simply on the basis of their general characteris-
tics. 
A certain difficulty in categorizing these trade unions has characterized much of 
the comparative literature on the topic Already twenty years ago, such well-informed 
authors as Anthony Ferner and Richard Hyman, in the first edition of their book on 
industrial relations in Europe (1992), argued that Italian industrial relations constituted 
an enigma, and that they were particularly difficult to interpret mainly because of the 
unpredictable behaviour and influence capacity of the trade unions. 
The aim of this article is to put forward an interpretation of Italian trade union-
ism which sees its distinctive feature in the persistence, more than elsewhere, of a con-
tinuing tension between the logic of the organization and the logic of the movement 
(Pizzorno, 1978; Regalia, 1988; Cella, 1999). At theoretical level, this requires rejection 
of interpretations substantially based on mere analysis of the forms and structure of 
institutions (on this see Baccaro & Howell, 2011), but also the simple use of quantita-
tive indicators (membership, figures on strikes, bargaining coverage), whose meanings 
vary greatly according to the circumstances (Franzosi, 1995), in favour of an actor-
centred approach (Scharpf, 1997).  
This will be done by discussing the strategy and organization of trade-union ac-
tion, and its outcomes, as they have evolved through the following main phases: that 
of largely unexpected development (1950s to the end of the 1970s); that of adjustment 
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made to the logic of action (1980s to the end of the 1990s); and that of the search for 
new solutions amid the difficulties of the political context and the economic crisis 
(2000s). First, however, brief description is required of the initial imprinting of the 
model, which stemmed from the ways in which the trade unions were reconstituted 
after WWII and whose far-reaching consequences are still apparent today.  
The original features 
Usually stressed in regard to Italian trade unionism is its traditionally close relationship 
with (if not dependence on) the political parties. In fact, the picture is more compli-
cated than this. Four points should be emphasized in explaining the original character-
istics of the model. 
A first point to stress is that trade unionism in Italy was revived in 1944 through 
the joint efforts of all the anti-fascist political parties in the form of a single organiza-
tion, the Cgil (Confederazione generale italiana del lavoro – Italian General Confederation of 
Labour), to represent all workers in the overall economy, with no distinction between 
members and non-members. This was a project which sprang from a period of ex-
traordinary unity of action among the parties during the years of resistance against the 
Nazis, and then the drafting of the Republican Constitution, amid great social effer-
vescence and labour mobilization. It corresponded to a wider endeavour to re-
establish democracy, in which the unions were to perform an important modernizing 
role. Articles 39 and 40 of the Republican Constitution of 1947 explicitly recognized 
the rights to organize trade unions and to strike, leaving implementation of those 
rights to subsequent legislation. Soon, however, with the electoral defeat of left parties 
in 1948, the beginning of the Cold War, and pressures applied by the Western allies 
for abatement of the influence of communists and socialists in the labour movement, 
the unitary endeavour broke down. Created between 1948 and 1950 were the Cisl 
(Confederazione italiana sindacati dei lavoratori – Italian Confederation of Workers’ Unions) 
and the Uil (Unione italiana del lavoro – Italian Union of Labour), following the with-
drawal from the Cgil of, respectively, the faction linked to the Christian Democrats 
and those connected with the small lay parties – the Republicans, the Social Democ-
rats and the reformist wing of the Socialists. The Communist and Socialist factions 
remained in the Cgil, which continued to be the largest organization. 
Over time, union ties with the political parties fluctuated, slackening greatly in pe-
riods of greatest union power. These beginnings, however, explain why Italian union 
pluralism is essentially based on ideological cleavages, and not as elsewhere on distinc-
tions of trade or occupation. 
A second point is that trade unionism was revived in a socio-economic context 
highly unfavourable to organized labour. At that time Italy was one of the most indus-
trially backward members of the original EEC. The country’s economic structure was 
characterized (and in many respects still is) by severe geographical disparities and by a 
marked bipolarism between a significant group of large firms and a very extensive 
number of small establishments. Self-employment was, and would remain, exception-
ally high. To this should be added the existence of a large underground economy. Un-
employment was very high and unevenly distributed; and it long fuelled large migra-
tory flows, or internal migrations to Italy’s more developed regions (Reyneri, 1989). 
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The evolution of Italian union pluralism thus began in a political context charac-
terized by the defeat of the left and its exclusion from government, but in which the 
leftist unions were and continued to be numerically the largest in size, and in an eco-
nomic context in which high unemployment, scant industrial development, and 
marked structural disparities greatly weakened and impeded the unions’ claimant 
power. Not surprisingly, therefore, articles 39 and 40 of the Constitution, which left it 
to subsequent legislation to establish criteria and rules on trade union representation, 
collective bargaining and exercise of the right to strike, were never implemented (ex-
cept to a very limited extent, and only in the 1990s, as regards strikes in essential pub-
lic services and the public-sector trade unions). It seemed neither opportune (given 
the risk of granting formal recognition to the leftist unions) nor necessary (given the 
unions’ economic weakness) to do so. 
Consequently, a third feature of Italy’s trade union system, and more generally of 
its industrial relations system, was its low level of institutionalization (Cella, 1989). Un-
ions and employers’ associations remained free voluntary organizations regulated by 
private law, and relations between them were largely determined by power relations, 
rather than by stable recognition of their role in regulating distributive conflict 
(Streeck, 1993). This had many consequences. In organizational terms, the arena of 
representation continued to be relatively open to newcomers: this helped the rank and 
file to challenge the strategies of the larger organizations, as exemplified by the growth 
of ‘autonomous’ unions – especially active in the particularistic representation of oc-
cupational and other small groups in services (Bordogna, 1994) – and by the recurrent 
emergence of militant opposition to the main trade unions, which hampered the de-
velopment of stable forms of cooperation. As regards action, in the absence of clear 
definition of mutually accepted procedures, recourse to conflict was encouraged as a 
way to test power relationships; and bargaining repeatedly shifted from the centralized 
to the decentralized level and back again, according to circumstances, while issues 
overlapped at various levels according to the claimant and market power of specific 
groups or categories of workers. 
On the other hand, a fourth feature to be stressed is a tendency (long covert) for 
the public administration to involve the industrial relations actors, and primarily the 
unions, in aspects of the implementation of social policies and the regulation of pub-
lic-sector employment through their incorporation in a vast range of tri-multi-partite 
committees (Cammelli, 1980). The reasons for this widespread involvement were ap-
parently a certain weakness of the public institutions and their low level of legitima-
tion, so that they found contact with, and the support of, the interest organizations 
beneficial. The most evident effect of this institutional involvement was the growth of 
a strong trade unionism in the public sector, together with peculiar ways of regulating 
employment relationships in this sector. Another, less evident but more pervasive, ef-
fect was the opportunities thus provided for extra resources to be introduced into the 
interplay of ‘voluntary’ relations among the parties, thereby modifying the results of 
market pressures. 
Organizationally, since their reconstitution, the three main peak organizations had 
been structured at all levels along the ‘horizontal’, or geographical-territorial, and the 
‘vertical’, or industrial, dimensions. Currently, the organization of each confederation 
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consists of the co-presence of both the horizontal and the vertical structures at the na-
tional, regional and territorial levels. To this matrix-type structuring of the unions 
should be added the presence of workplace representation structures, whose organiza-
tional form has been repeatedly revised, but which have led to the further consolida-
tion of the trade-unions’ potential to exert influence (Regalia, 1995). This complex or-
ganizational structure not only allowed trade union initiative to switch rapidly between 
the centre and the periphery, and between more general and more sectoral strategies, 
thereby favouring change, but it also made it possible to pursue different courses of 
action simultaneously. This last property was of particular importance in an informal 
context of ideologically-based competitive unionism, since it allowed the experimental, 
pragmatic, and quasi-covert development in the periphery of strategies different from 
those ‘officially’ enjoined by the organizations at the centre, thus increasing the flexi-
bility and adaptability of union action. 
To conclude, as an effect of the combination of these different and partly contra-
dictory original features, Italian trade unionism developed in a manner characterized 
by a dual tension (Regalia & Regini, 1998): that between the official (often intransi-
gent) positions of the public discourse of the actors at the centre of the system and 
the actions (often more pragmatic and adaptive) undertaken in the periphery; and that 
between voluntarism and scant formalization of relations between the labour-market 
organizations and their high institutional involvement in the administration of social 
policies.  
The period of trade-union development 
Since their reconstitution, the evolution of the Italian trade unions’ role and power 
appears to have been largely connected to the trend of the economy, whilst, unlike in 
other countries, it does not seem to have correlated with the traditional indicators of 
trade-union strength, primarily that of unionization. 
From the 1940s onwards, as the Italian economy gathered strength on interna-
tional markets, so the unions increased their bargaining power. After an initial period 
of strongly centralized action characterized by dependence on the political system by 
organizations with little influence in the labour market (1950s), there ensued a period 
of limited decentralization of collective bargaining and greater autonomy from the 
parties (early 1960s), and then another one of marked decentralization of collective 
bargaining, pronounced autonomy from the political system, and strong revival of un-
ion unity in the period of extraordinary collective mobilization of the years around the 
so-called ‘Hot Autumn’ (late 1960s and early 1970s). The period of economic crisis 
due to the oil shocks of the 1970s was characterized by a phase of bargaining recen-
tralization by unions now become highly influential and de facto recognized by their 
private and public counterparts, and willing to moderate their demands in exchange 
for actions for economic and social modernization (late 1970s-early 1980s) (Regalia & 
Regini, 1998). This led to the first attempts – which soon failed, however – at macro-
concertation (Regini, 1995). But it marked the onset of a new phase. 
During this evolution and the repeated shift between centralized and decentral-
ized initiative, there arose in quite disordered manner a bipolar system of collective 
bargaining centred on industry-wide agreements, but which actually foresaw supple-
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mentary negotiations at plant level. This pattern received explicit formalization in the 
tripartite agreement of July 1993. But of principal interest here is the fact that, because 
of these bargaining practices, supported by the decisions of the labour courts, bargain-
ing coverage stabilized at around 80 percent of the labour force, notwithstanding the 
absence of explicit mechanisms for the extension of contracts.   
The entire process was largely driven by confrontation and conflict between the 
two sides of industry, the levels of which were and continued to be particularly high, 
although they diminished after the peak of the 1970s (see Table 1), and were only 
partly reflected in union memberships.  
Table 1: Days lost through industrial action per 1,000 employees, in various countries, 
1950-2008 (annual averages)  
 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2008 
Denmark  5.7 13.6 39.6 40.0 39.3 24.4* 
France**  83.1 118.5 86.6 20.9 14.5 n-a. 
Germany  6.0 3.1 7.6 5.2 6.6 3.3 
Italy 117.9 175.9 456.9 320.2 90.7 67.8 
Sweden  2.0 1.3 5.1 28.6 7.3 2.9 
Netherlands  3.6 4.1 5.9 4.1 4.7 4.2 
UK 27.8 55.7 65.2 42.3 7.7 14.8 
USA 35.8 25.2 26.7 5.8 2.2 1.0 
*  2000-07. 
**Data for 1968 not included. 
Source: Bordogna (2010) 
 
Differently from many European countries, where the evolution of unionization in 
the post-war period was characterized by relatively linear increases in union member-
ships until the economic crisis triggered by the 1973 oil shock, after which they tended 
to diminish, or at most remained unchanged (La Valle, 1994), the unionization pattern 
in Italy was characterized by two peaks and two downturns (Checchi & Corneo, 
2000).  
The first peak was recorded during the period of social mobilization in the im-
mediate post-war years prior to the split of 1948, when membership of the unitary 
Cgil was estimated at 5.7 million (Turone, 1973: 159). From 1950 onwards there was a 
constant decline in memberships, which continued, even during the expansionary pe-
riod of the ‘economic miracle’, until the end of the 1960s, when they fell to their low-
est levels. Memberships then revived substantially throughout the 1970s (even during 
the initial phases of the economic crisis) until the late 1970s, when the second peak in 
memberships occurred and the unionization rate reached its apogee at around 50 per 
cent – an especially significant percentage for a productive system characterized by the 
predominance of small and micro firms (see Table 2). However the 1980s would see a 
new phase of decline similar to the one recorded in most other countries, as discussed 
below. 
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Table 2: Union memberships (000s) and union density (%), 1950-1979 
Year  CGIL CISL UIL Total union  
membership 
Union density* 
1950 4,641 1,190 n.a. 5,830 50.8 
1951 4,491 1,338 n.a. 5,829 50.9 
1952 4,342 1,322 n.a. 5,664 48.8 
1953 4,075 1,305 n.a. 5,380 45.6 
1954 4,134 1,327 n.a. 5,461 44.6 
1955 4,194 1,342 n.a. 5,536 43.9 
1956 3,666 1,707 n.a. 5,374 42.0 
1957 3,138 1,262 n.a. 4,400 34.2 
1958 2,596 1,654 n.a. 4,250 32.7 
1959 2,601 1,284 n.a. 3,885 29.7 
1960 2,583 1,324 550 4.457 28.5 
1961 2,531 1,399 560 4.490 28.2 
1962 2,611 1,435 590 4.636 28.2 
1963 2,625 1,504 600 4.729 28.6 
1964 2,712 1,515 640 4.867 29.7 
1965 2,543 1,468 615 4.626 28.5 
1966 2,458 1,491 620 4.569 28.0 
1967 2,424 1,523 625 4.572 27.7 
1968 2,461 1,627 648 4.736 28.7 
1969 2,626 1,641 714 4.981 29.4 
1970 2,943 1,808 780 5,530 38.5 
1971 3,138 1,973 825 5,937 41.1 
1972 3,215 2,184 843 6,242 43.2 
1973 3,436 2,214 902 6,553 44.6 
1974 3,827 2,473 965 7,264 47.2 
1975 4,081 2,594 1,033 7,708 48.5 
1976 4,313 2,824 1,105 8,242 48.7 
1977 4,475 2,810 1,160 8,445 49.0 
1978 4,528 2,869 1,285 8,682 48.9 
1979 4,584 2,906 1,327 8,817 48.4 
* Density refers to the active, dependent and employed members (excluding retired, unemployed and self-employed mem-
bers). 
Source: Romagnoli and Della Rocca (1989) 
 
Even from this brief outline it is evident that trade-union membership in Italy was 
only weakly correlated with economic trends. Declining membership between 1950 
and circa 1970 was instead connected with ‘political’ reasons: divisions in the unions 
and repression of the rank and file in the workplace especially during the 1950s (Della 
Rocca, 1976). And it was the result of two distinct tendencies: the marked decline of 
the Cgil after the 1948 split, which lost two million members in just over fifteen years, 
and a relatively modest increase in the Cisl, which gained around half a million mem-
bers, followed by a similar trend by the Uil. Symmetrically, the subsequent revival in 
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membership during the 1970s, until the point of greatest growth in 1978, was closely 
connected with the period of extraordinary collective mobilization in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, during which the trade-union confederations regained strong unity of 
action, their relationships with workers were radically redefined, and, for both mem-
bers and non-members, novel spaces were opened up for participation and control 
from below through the spread of assemblies and the creation of new workplace rep-
resentation structures (factory councils) (Regalia 1995). In this context, membership of 
the trade-union confederations ensued ‘spontaneously’ from the solidarity and the 
new collective identities brought into being by the mobilization, while traditional op-
positions along party-ideological lines greatly attenuated. At organizational level, after 
the strong opposition raised by the parties had dashed widespread hopes of reunifica-
tion among the three trade-union confederations, 1972 saw creation of the Unitary 
Federation of Cgil, Cisl and Uil, which for some years permitted unitary recruitment, 
so that a worker could join the union without having to select a confederation.  
Econometric analyses (Checchi & Corneo, 2000) have indeed shown that, in Italy, 
the variable with which the aggregate membership trends appear to be most closely 
correlated is participation in strikes. After a brief time lag, the membership curve 
tends to follow that of strike action. In a situation of voluntary trade unionism, where 
closed shops were never possible, nor were strike funds ever available, and in which 
the unions had no active role in labour market management, this finding highlights the 
extent to which unionization can be based on identity and social incentives not neces-
sarily connected with traditional party affiliation. 
Attempts to adjusting the logic of action:  
trade unions between 1984 and 2001 
With the 1980s there began a new phase characterized at productive level by processes 
of industrial adjustment and reorganization, and emblematically inaugurated for the 
unions by their ‘defeat’ in the Fiat company dispute of 1980 (Golden, 1997).  
After the modest results, and finally the failure in 1984, of the first attempts at 
macro-level concertation, the Unitary Federation came to an end and competition re-
sumed among the confederations at national level. On the periphery of the system, 
however, there began a new period of decentralized unitary trade-union initiative – 
termed ‘sheltered microconcertation’ by Marino Regini (1995) – in which the work-
place representative structures and the local trade-union organizations cooperated 
with management on joint management of the post-Fordist restructuring and trans-
formation of the production system (second half of the 1980s). During the subsequent 
period of economic crisis and the accelerating process of European integration and 
construction of the EMU, in a domestic context characterized by the ‘Tangentopoli’ 
(Bribesville) scandals and the collapse of the traditional party system, there began a 
new phase of re-centralized trade-union action and social pacts whereby the trade un-
ions successfully contributed with the government and employers to defining incomes 
polices and reforms of the pensions system and the labour market, and in which the 
bipolar structure of collective bargaining was formalized for the first time (1990s) 
(Regini & Regalia, 1997). 
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In regard to relationships with workers, whilst until the end of the 1970s unioni-
zation had developed ‘spontaneously’, in this new phase the trend went into reverse, 
and the trade unions, albeit with a certain delay, began to actively re-think their prac-
tices and strategies of representation. It is these new developments that are now exam-
ined. 
Membership trends 
1980 represented, as said, a second turning point in union membership. And it did so 
from two points of view.  
Table 3: Net and total union membership (000s) and union density (%), 1980-2005 
Year  Net union  membership* Union density Total union membership 
   Cgil Cisl Uil Total 
1980 7.189,0 49,6 4.599,1 3.059,8 1.346,9 9.005,8 
1981 6.961,8 48,0 4.595,0 2.988,8 1.357,3 8.941,1 
1982 6.756,8 46,7 4.576,0 2.976,9 1.358,0 8.910,9 
1983 6.536,0 45,5 4.556,1 2.953,4 1351,5 8.861,0 
1984 6.458,1 45,3 4.546,3 3.097,2 1.344,5 8.988,0 
1985 6.125,5 42,5 4.592,0 2.953,1 1.306,3 8.851,4 
1986 5.838,5 40,4 4.647,0 2.975,5 1.305,7 8.928,2 
1987 5.789,4 40,0 4.743,0 3.080,0 1.343,7 9.166,7 
1988 5.851,1 39,8 4.867,4 3.288,3 1.398,0 9.553,7 
1989 5.815,4 39,4 5.026,9 3.379,0 1.439,2 9.845,1 
1990 5.872,4 38,8 5.150,4 3.508,4 1.485,8 10.144,6 
1991 5.913,3 38,7 5.221,8 3.657,1 1.524,1 10.403,0 
1992 5.906,1 38,9 5.231,3 3.796,2 1.571,8 10.599,3 
1993 5.661,0 39,2 5.236,6 3.769,2 1.588,4 10.594,2 
1994 5.489,5 38,7 5.247,2 3.752,4 1.594,1 10.593,7 
1995 5.341,2 38,1 5.235,4 3.772,9 1.579,1 10.587,4 
1996 5.266,4 37,4 5.209,3 3.837,1 1.593,6 10.640,0 
1997 5.142,3 36,2 5.215,3 3.856,3 1.588,3 10.659,9 
1998 5.123,0 35,7 5.249,0 3.909,8 1.603,9 10.762,7 
1999 5.177,1 35,4 5.287,0 4.000,5 1.621,8 10.909,3 
2000 5.194,5 34,8 5.354,5 4.084,0 1.628,6 11.067,1 
2001 5.232,7 34,2 5.402,4 4.117,5 1.628,7 11.148,6 
2002 5.281,8 33,8 5.461,2 4.153,1 1.651,7 11.266,1 
2003 5.324,8 33,7 5.515,5 4.183,8 1.697,2 11.396,5 
2004 5.405,4 34,1 5.587,3 4.260,9 1.740,9 11.589,2 
2005 5.468,1 33,6 5.617,8 4.287,6 1.756,3 11.661,7 
2006 5.539,7 33,2 5.650,9 4.347,0 1.766,5 11.764,4 
2007 5.664,7 33,5 5.697,8 4.427,0 1.810,9 11.935,7 
2008 5.749,7 33,4 5.734,9 4.507,3 1.811,6 12.053,8 
2009 5.908,1 34,7 5.746,2 4.531,1 1.862,5 12.139,8 
2010 5.920,9 35,1 5.750,0 4.542,4 1.872,2 12.164,5 
* Net union membership = total membership minus union members outside the active and employed labour force (i.e. retired, 
unemployed and self-employed members). 
Source: ICTWSS database (Visser, 2011). 
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Firstly, enrolments with Cgil, Cisl and Uil among active workers again began to de-
cline (see Table 3). Between 1980 and 2010, the loss amounted to an 18 per cent de-
crease. In the same period the unionization rate fell by 15 percentage points, from 
about 50 to 35 per cent. The decline was not uniform, however, being much more ac-
centuated between 1980 and 1990. Over the next ten years, the decline relented. 
Thereafter, memberships – as well as unionization rate – tended to stabilize, and there 
were even modest increases.  
Secondly, matters were however different if we consider the aggregate data on 
memberships: that is, those which include pensioners and, to a much lesser extent, 
unemployed and other non-dependent workers as well. In this case, enrolments con-
tinued to grow steadily, as discussed below. 
The decrease, stabilization, and then slight increase in memberships among active 
workers after 1980 resulted from various processes. The Cgil lost the most members, 
with an overall decline of 28 per cent between 1980 and 2005. The fall was especially 
marked in the 1980s and then less severe in the 1990s, while there was a 7 per cent re-
vival thereafter. The overall loss by Cisl was a 20 per cent decrease, somewhat more 
marked in the 1980s, with a 12 per cent revival between 2000 and 2005. The smallest 
confederation, Uil, achieved the best performance, in that its membership remained 
substantially unchanged throughout the period considered.  
As a consequence of these differing trends, there was an erosion in the dominant 
position of the Cgil (whose weight in the total diminished from 47 per cent in 1980 to 
43.5 per cent in 2005); substantial stability between 1980 and 2000 in the Cisl’s posi-
tion (settling at around 35 per cent) and a slight improvement thereafter (36 per cent 
in 2005); and a progressive increase in the Uil’s share (from 17 per cent in 1980 to 
20.5 per cent in 2005).  
Corresponding to this closer balance among the confederations was increasing 
uniformity in the sectoral distribution of their members. Between 1981 and 2004 all 
three organizations greatly increased their presence in the services sector, while the 
percentages of their members in industry and agriculture diminished. The change was 
particularly marked in the case of the Cgil, although it was still the union with the larg-
est membership in industry. By 2004, the proportion of Cgil’s members working in 
private services had exceeded 25 per cent, reaching the Cisl level; while in 2002, an 
event unprecedented in the history of the Cgil, the public sector union became the 
country’s largest union for active workers in terms of membership, overtaking the glo-
rious metalworkers’ union. 
The trends illustrated by Table 4, which shows unionization rates by sector, also 
aid understanding of change dynamics at aggregate level. It is the marked decline of 
members in the highly unionized branches of industry (a decline largely linked to dras-
tic job losses in the large industrial companies during the 1980s and 1990s) not suffi-
ciently off-set by growth in services, particularly private ones, that explains the differ-
ing dynamics of the decrease in unionization. Vice versa, it has been the shift of trade 
union presence to the services sector that signals a reversal of tendency, or at least a 
halt in the decline in recent years. However, if one considers that, according to the 
2003 national accounting data, 4 per cent of dependent employees worked in agricul-
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ture, 20 per cent in industry, and 76 per cent in services (Vaona, 2006), it is evident 
that trade union followings continue to be quantitatively imbalanced towards the tradi-
tional sectors. 
Table 4: Union density by sector, 1981, 1990, 1997 
 1981 1990 1997 
Agriculture 100.0 84.5 86.7 
Industry  48.8 41.7 40.4 
Marketable services 27.1 24.1 20.3 
Non-marketable services 51.4 48.2 44.8 
Total wage earners 46.6 39.3 35.8 
Source: Baccaro et al. (2003) 
 
The case of the pensioners  
As said, the unionization of pensioners has instead been in constant expansion, and 
apparently without particular organizational investments. This growth has not only 
off-set the loss of members among active workers, but it has also considerably in-
creased overall memberships (see Table 3): which means that enrolments with the 
pensioners’ unions have gradually approached, and then slightly exceeded, those with 
the unions for active workers. 
Various factors account for this distinctively Italian feature. One is that, in Italy, 
the trade-union organization of pensioners does not take place within the unions to 
which they belonged during their working lives (as generally elsewhere), but within 
dedicated organizations representing all pensioners regardless of provenance. These 
are organizations affiliated to the confederations, but with distinct organizational fea-
tures: union dues are lower; the number of members, which is obviously not included 
in calculation of unionization and representativeness rates, has less weight in deter-
mining equilibriums internally to the confederations. A second and fundamental factor 
is the institutional involvement of the union benefit advice centres (the patronati) in the 
administration of pensions and other welfare programs. In a situation where the pub-
lic offices are quite inefficient, these advice centres are of great importance for work-
ers when they retire. One may say that this is a kind of equivalent of the Ghent system 
mechanism for the unionization of active members in the Nordic countries (Ebbing-
haus et al., 2011). Also to be mentioned is the autonomous capacity of these unions to 
organize cultural, recreational and voluntary activities which are greatly appreciated by 
retired workers. 
The expansion of pensioner unionism has had two contradictory consequences 
for the confederations. On the one hand, this growth made less evident and worrying 
the progressive decrease in membership by active workers and was an autonomous 
source of funding for the unions on a solidaristic basis. On the other hand, the in-
creased importance of this category influenced the general strategies of the confedera-
tions by keeping their attention focused on pensions and welfare, and making reform 
more complex.  
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Readjustments in representation strategies 
The difficulties encountered by the confederal unions in building adequate representa-
tion among active workers in sectors undergoing the greatest expansion have been 
due not only to changes in the productive structure, but also to changes – partly but 
not completely connected with the former – in supply on the labour market. 
The most significant phenomena in this regard have been an extraordinary in-
crease first in the female labour supply, and second in young workers much better 
educated than previous generations, and often employed in the services sectors: both 
of which are categories comprising workers on the margins of the representation 
strategies traditionally pursued by the unions. Since the 1990s there has also been un-
precedented growth in the presence of non-EU immigrant workers, and a sizeable in-
crease in workers on temporary and flexible contracts. 
The need to find more suitable ways to represent women and young people fig-
ured in union debate after the congresses of 1981. For example, Cgil started introduc-
ing councils and committees which at various levels, sometimes in linkage with femi-
nist and other social movements, sought to renew relations with female and young 
workers. Experimentation also began with quota systems for the representation of 
women on union steering committees (Beccalli & Meardi, 2002). The 1991 Cgil Stat-
ute stipulated that at least 40 percent of representatives must be female. The election 
in 2010 of Susanna Camusso as the first ever female general secretary of the Cgil – 
and the first in the history of the three Italian confederations – is the clearest latest 
outcome of the new trend.  
Since the 1990s the principal concerns of the unions have been the new problems 
raised by the growing numbers of immigrant workers and of workers on non-standard 
contracts. 
The increase in immigration is unprecedented in the history of a country which 
long used to be one of emigration, and which never enacted clear legislation to regu-
late inflows or policies for the integration of immigrants. In this under-regulated con-
text, the unions initially furnished assistance and social protection, seeking to make up 
for institutional shortcomings. Consequently, the unions’ local structures opened of-
fices providing immigrants with information on access to the labour market or to wel-
fare programs, assisting them with bureaucratic procedures, or helping them to find 
accommodation. In so doing, the unions were able to draw on the long experience in 
dealing with the local institutions developed by their service centres (benefit advice 
bureaus, legal offices, tax assistance centres, trade-union and vocational training cen-
tres, tenants’ associations, recreational services) established at their horizontal local 
branches. More recently, there has emerged a greater endeavour to organize immi-
grants on more properly union terrain (Marino, 2012). This has come about in various 
ways: by putting issues of concern to immigrants on the bargaining agendas of the sec-
toral unions; by including demands regarding immigrant employment and social inte-
gration in negotiations for local development (as in the territorial pact of Eastern Ve-
neto) (Bertolotti & Giaccone, 2006); and by assisting immigrants in individual labour 
disputes. As a result, trade-union enrolments by immigrant workers have been increas-
ing. In the early 2000s, an estimated 45 per cent of regular immigrant workers were 
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members of the confederal unions, a figure above the average for native workers. To 
be noted, moreover, is the increasing number of immigrants working as trade-union 
officials. 
While attempts by the unions to improve their organization of women, immi-
grants and, to a lesser extent, better-educated young people have led mainly to the 
creation of locally-based offices or specialized work groups given the task of renewing 
representation strategies, in the case of workers with atypical or non-standard con-
tracts, the organizational solution has been to create new specialized unions affiliated 
to the confederations (Cella, 2012). The process has come about by degrees. In the 
mid-1990s self-help associations of various kinds were set up by groups of freelances, 
especially in Milan. Drawing on these experiences, in 1997 a union representing atypi-
cal workers (NIdiL) affiliated to Cgil was set up (Ballarino, 2006). Similar organiza-
tions were then created by Cisl (Alai, now Felsa) and Uil (Cpo, now UILtemp). All 
these are unions of an entirely new kind, given that the basis of their representation is 
not common membership of a sector, trade or occupation but a specific form of em-
ployment contract. In other words, these are crosswise unions whose explicit objective 
is to increase the protection afforded to self-employed and temporary workers, and 
whose development has been made possible by the horizontal organizational logic of 
Italian trade unionism. Only a small minority of the potential members are affiliated to 
these new unions. However, this has not prevented the development of remarkable 
bargaining activity at both the national and local levels (D’Andrea et al, 2004; Bal-
larino, 2006; Pedersini, 2005), particularly for agency workers, in favour of whom spe-
cific forms of welfare provision and employment protection have been introduced. A 
still unresolved problem, though, is the relationship between representation of typical 
and atypical workers, which, as in the case of immigrant workers, has raised new di-
lemmas for union action (Regalia, 2006). 
Organizational changes 
Organizational changes have also been promoted at more general level, and with re-
gard to the more traditional areas of representation. 
On the one hand, as in other countries (Streeck & Visser, 1997; Ebbinghaus 
2004), the period considered has seen a slow but steady tendency to rationalize and 
simplify the organizational structure by merging categories together. At present, taking 
also the new unions for atypical workers into account, Cgil comprises 12 sectoral un-
ions for active workers, Cisl has 18, and Uil 17. They were respectively 20, 31 and 28 
in 1980 (Visser, 2011).  
More important, however, are the changes and adjustments in the unions’ rela-
tionships with their members. A first new development is the introduction of the se-
cret ballot referendum in order to consult the rank and file, whether union members 
or otherwise. This method was first used in 1986 on the occasion of renewal of the 
metalworkers’ industry-wide collective agreement, in a period of steep decline in union 
memberships, and in which cleavages once again opened up among the confederal un-
ions, as signalled by the break-up of the unitary Cgil-Cisl-Uil Federation in 1984. It 
thereafter became relatively common practice in the case of important agreement re-
newals, or on which there were major disagreements among the unions. On a larger 
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scale, the referendum method was sometimes used during the 1990s – as well as again 
in 2007 – on the occasion of social pacts reached between the government and the so-
cial partners on critical social policy decisions (Regini, 1997; Baccaro et al, 2003). 
However, this method never became routine practice, both because of its high organ-
izational costs and because (as pointed out by Cisl in particular) its excessive use might 
de-legitimate the decision-making capacity of the union executives. 
A second aspect to be emphasized concerns the issue of in-company representa-
tion. In the early 1980s, a broad network of the works councils introduced during the 
period of collective mobilization continued to operate in the private sector of the 
economy. These were unitary representative bodies elected by all workers and which 
also represented the trade-unions in that the latter recognized them as their grass-root 
organizations. However, in keeping with the voluntaristic nature of Italian industrial 
relations, they were characterized by the marked informality of their functioning. This 
had for long facilitated their capacity to adapt to the circumstances, so that with time 
they had often become means to give voice to, and liaise collectively between, person-
nel and management in firms seeking flexible alternatives to rigid work organization 
methods. The persistence of these bodies helps explain why cleavages among the un-
ions were rarely matched by a breakdown of unity in workplaces (Regalia 1995). With 
time, however, the drawbacks to the marked informality of this form of representation 
became evident – in particular their uneven development largely determined by power 
relationships and the unpredictability of their behaviour. Finally, in 1993 a new single 
form of workplace representation to cover the overall economy was introduced with 
the July social pact on incomes policy and the reorganization of the collective bargain-
ing system.  
The new structure was named Rappresentanza sindacale unitaria (Rsu –Unitary union 
representation) to stress the unions’ formal commitment to endowing themselves with 
a unitary body in workplaces. In reality, the representational model was not very dif-
ferent from that of the ‘old’ councils. But unlike the latter, the constitution of the Rsu 
was expressly envisaged by a national-level agreement, the first to regulate such mat-
ters after thirty years of informal arrangements, signed in December 1993 between the 
employers’ associations and the union confederations. Not approved instead was the 
Ministry of Labour’s proposal that the Rsu should be defined by legislation (as in fact 
subsequently happened in 1997, but only for the public sector). This is one reason for 
the enduring systemic weakness, demonstrated by figures on the still unsatisfactory 
diffusion of Rsu (CESOS, 2000), and recently by specific cases of opting-out by em-
ployers (as in the case of Fiat cited below). In 1994 and 1995, however, under the im-
petus of general satisfaction with the agreement, the workplace representative bodies 
were renewed to an extent unknown since the early 1980s; and thus relationships with 
workers were revived as well. The outcome was striking: according to official data, 
more than 70 per cent of those entitled to do so turned out to vote; and wherever 
elections were held, confederal unionism obtained large majorities of votes and of rep-
resentatives (95 per cent and 96 per cent respectively) (Carrieri, 1995). This also led to 
a broad turnover of workplace representatives that was interpreted as a strong signal 
of democratic renewal.  
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A further attempt to strengthen the unions’ presence in workplaces was the pro-
ject to introduce territorial-based delegates in order to give representation to workers 
in small artisanal firms, which represent an extremely important component of the 
Italian economy. A nationwide agreement on the matter had been reached between 
the trade unions and the artisanal associations at the end of the 1980s. Although data 
on the implementation of the system are not available, it seems that it has achieved 
only limited success; and more specifically that, to date, it has been used in the most 
unionized areas of the country, above all to designate territorial delegates tasked with 
monitoring workplace health and safety issues. It is likely, moreover, that in the case 
of small firms it is difficult to find workers willing to accept representation duties, es-
pecially if they are on uncertain territorial bases, i.e. extending beyond their own firms. 
These are tasks that might be more properly undertaken by external officials in linkage 
with the local branches of the trade unions. Recently – and this brings us to events of 
the past few years – new initiatives which may prove more successful are those to or-
ganize the employees of small service firms agglomerated on specific sites, as in the 
case of factory outlet centres (Gasparri 2011). 
The new difficulties at the political level and the impact of the economic 
crisis  
The international financial and economic crisis which began in 2007 and has affected 
Italy mainly since the end of 2008, erupted in a context initially characterized, from 
the economic point of view, by an economy already in crisis, and from the industrial 
relations’ point of view, by the persistence, indeed the exacerbation, of unresolved 
problems, but also by prospects of renewal in the near future.  
Trade unions and industrial relations before the financial crisis 
For the unions in the early 2000s, the unsolved problems concerned not so much rela-
tionships with workers (in favour of whom attempts had been made to renew repre-
sentation strategies for some time, and among whom, as said, trade-union enrolments 
had slightly increased), as relationships with the government in a context characterized 
in general by a progressive loss of competitiveness by the manufacturing sector and 
the economy whose gravity was for long denied by the political leaders (De Novellis & 
Vaciago, 2011).  
In 2001 the elections were won by a centre-right coalition which governed the 
country, with a brief interlude in 2006-8, until 2011, and which immediately an-
nounced its intention to switch from the concertation of economic and social policies 
with the unions, which had largely characterized the 1990s, to a less binding ‘social 
dialogue’ with ‘those who are available’. Simultaneously, a change took place at the top 
of the largest employers’ association (Confindustria) with the election as president of a 
small businessman with little interest in smooth relations with the unions. In this new 
climate, proposals for reform (in regard to dismissals, the labour market, and thereaf-
ter revision of the bargaining structure and reorganization of public-sector employ-
ment) had the effect of fostering a recurrent polarization at national level between the 
Cgil, which tended to oppose the government, and the Cisl and the Uil, which sought 
dialogue with it.  
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Within this context, the early 2000s were marked by a resumption of industrial 
conflict driven both by strictly economic factors – in particular, the greater difficulty 
compared with the previous period of renewing collective agreements without resort-
ing to strike action – and by general strikes and demonstrations, sometimes organized 
by the Cgil alone (as in 2002), against the government’s economic and social policies.  
In some cases, separate agreements were reached. However, this did not prevent 
substantially unitary trade-union action from continuing in workplaces and the devel-
opment of experimental schemes, also at local level, for specific groups of workers, as 
said. Nor did it prevent the reaching of innovative collective agreements in many sec-
tors – such as telecommunications, banking and chemicals – and in the broad branch 
of crafts businesses. Indeed, it was in this period that original forms of employment 
security for the agency workers were negotiated unitarily; and there spread the new 
phenomenon of the social negotiation of local welfare between the pensioners’ trade 
unions, often flanked by the local-level structures of the confederations, and the local 
administrations (Colombo & Regalia 2011). 
Since 2004 in particular, there have been increasing signs of another possible re-
versal of tendency. Among the most significant are the following: the election of a 
new president of Confindustria, who declared his intention to re-launch dialogue with 
the unions and give renewed impetus to concertation; the government’ resumption of 
the practice of consulting the unions before drafting the budget law; the convening of 
a unitary national assembly of Cgil, Cisl and Uil delegates (the first for many years); 
the signing by the three union confederations and thirteen employers’ associations of 
a joint document, submitted to the government, setting out proposals to revitalize the 
economy of the Mezzogiorno. In 2007, during the brief interlude of a centre-left gov-
ernment, a new social pact – on welfare – was reached and which, as in the 1990s, was 
submitted to approval by workers through referendum. Simultaneously, contacts in-
tensified among the confederations around the two most controversial issues in the 
debate on industrial relations – the revision of the bargaining system as defined by the 
social pact of 1993 and the introduction of criteria to measure the various unions’ rep-
resentativeness – on which a joint position was reached in 2008. 
The impact of the crisis 
However, the same year was marked by the eruption of the financial and economic 
crisis and the re-election of a centre-right government, so that a series of contradictory 
tendencies re-emerged.  
At the level of initiatives to deal with the crisis and rising unemployment, cohe-
sion consolidated among the trade unions and with the employers. Initially, in 2009, 
the social partners were involved in definition with the government of measures to 
support workers hit by the crisis (mainly through the extension of forms of social 
shock absorbers). Thereafter, in early 2010, unions and employers began to meet to 
draw up a reform plan to be submitted to the government on seven critical topics: re-
search and innovation, social emergency, simplification of public administration, the 
South, public spending, tax and productivity (Rinolfi, 2010). However, the agreement 
– reached on all the issues except the last one – did not lead to concrete results in a 
political context characterized by the government’s increasing inadequacy in facing the 
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crisis. Nor did it directly influence the economic and social strategies of the Monti 
technocrat government installed in November 2011.  
At the level of industrial relations more in general – i.e. to do with long-standing 
issues not necessarily or directly connected with the crisis – tensions and divisions re-
sumed among the trade unions on certain events with a strong media impact. One was 
the controversial reform of the collective bargaining system in 2009 – an agreement 
on the rules – achieved with an interconfederal agreement strongly backed by the gov-
ernment but not signed by the Cgil, which regarded it as excessively detrimental to the 
position reached unitarily among the trade unions the year before. Contested above all 
was the loosely defined possibility for company-level agreements to derogate from the 
national one. The second event consisted of the controversial episodes that occurred 
in 2010-1 at the Italian Fiat plants of Pomigliano (near Naples in the South) and 
Mirafiori (at Turin in the North) following the imposition by the management of a 
radical reorganization of work as its condition not to move production abroad 
(Pedersini, 2011). In both cases, the proposal was not signed by the metalworkers’ 
trade union of the Cgil, within a context of severe tensions and social conflict which 
dragged on for a long time and led to a profound change in the company’s industrial 
relations practices, to Fiat’s withdrawal from the national collective agreement and 
from the agreement on the in-company worker representation bodies (Rsu), and fi-
nally to its exit from the employers’ association. 
On the other hand, however, there ensued other (and much more numerous) 
events of entirely the opposite sign. In fact, to be considered is that, besides the media 
clamour that initially surrounded the split among the confederations – often described 
as marking the beginning of a new era characterized by the decline of the Cgil and by 
more cooperative and modern industrial relations – it was not at all clear what might 
be the consequences of a trial of strength with the largest trade union in a context still 
characterized by a low level of institutionalization. As a consequence, the employers’ 
representatives soon sought to establish informal contacts with the Cgil. 
Already from the autumn of 2009 onwards, soon after another important agree-
ment was reached without the metalworkers’ union affiliated to Cgil, a period of uni-
tary agreements (at both the sector and company level) in fact began, in which ironi-
cally all parties claimed to implement the rules that each considered the proper ones. 
In reality, this was a case of the system’s ability to adapt pragmatically to the situation.  
There was also an intensification of unitary agreements and experiments at other 
levels, especially in order to cope with the consequences of the economic crisis. These 
included bipartite cross-sectoral agreements at regional/territorial level among the so-
cial partners to boost the economy, defend employment, promote forms of local wel-
fare programmes (an example being the pact signed at Treviso in Veneto in 2011); in-
novative agreements at company level (even in the metalworking sector) on restructur-
ing and/or employment stability and negotiated forms of company welfare; and fi-
nally, widespread negotiation with the local authorities on anti-crisis support measures, 
life-work conciliation, welfare and other social issues, in which the trade unions act 
not only as representatives in the labour market but also as representatives of citizens 
more generally. Also reinforced was the joint management of training programmes, 
and of social and mutualistic welfare schemes, in bilateral bodies jointly with the em-
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ployers’ organizations, especially for temporary agency workers and the artisanal sec-
tor. 
Moreover, also in regard to the rules, a unitary interconfederal agreement on 
trade-union representativeness and collective bargaining was reached in June 2011. 
This agreement has great potential and could heal the split of 2009. It may provide the 
basis for a more balanced and solid reconfiguration of relations among the parties. 
However, the agreement still requires further specifications before it can be im-
plemented. The most recent development (21 November 2012) has instead been the 
signing – on request by the technical Monti government – of a new agreement on 
productivity among all the social partners except the Cgil. The agreement (widely criti-
cised as nebulous and inadequate) foresees a downscaling of the egalitarian effects of 
national collective bargaining and an expansion of issues negotiated at company-level 
in order to better respond to the productive needs of firms (Lucifora & Origo, 2012). 
In the meantime, it seems that the Cgil is preparing a proposal on the same issue, but 
with the ambitious aim of overcoming the dualism in protection between insiders and 
outsiders, according to its traditional inclusive stance (Mascini, 2012).  
It is therefore evident that relations among the parties continue to be controver-
sial and unstable.   
Conclusions  
From many points of view, after the period of centralization and social pacts of the 
1990s, but also the more turbulent recent period of renewed conflict with the gov-
ernment and employers and of divisions among trade unions, the confederations seem 
to be stronger (or less weak) and better organized than they were towards the end of 
the 1980s.  
The decline in union membership among active workers has apparently halted: 
indeed, there are signs, albeit weak, of a revival; the organizational structure of the sec-
toral unions has been streamlined; ‘autonomous’ trade unionism has declined; defini-
tion has been given (although in still unsatisfactory manner) to a system of workplace 
union representation which operates throughout the economy; experimental schemes 
have been launched and new solutions adopted for the organization of workers, such 
as immigrants and non-standard workers, who do not belong to the traditional core of 
union representation. 
As regards action, the unions today operate in many ways and at many levels, and 
they perform numerous functions. Besides their traditional activities of collective bar-
gaining at industry-wide and company levels, political initiatives vis-à-vis governments, 
and the provision of benefit advice and assistance to members and workers in general, 
we have seen that their range of action now extends into other levels and in other di-
rections. Notable are the activities undertaken by the unions in the form of local-level 
agreements or pacts with employers and/or administrations on issues such as local 
development and the defence of employment, but also social and welfare schemes for 
the local population. Besides the traditional distributive and productive functions of 
the unions, therefore, one may now also speak of their social functions. 
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In effect, with the demise of the great mass parties in early 1990s, the unions are 
today the largest and most ubiquitous organizations in civil society. They are present 
with structures, both general and specific, at the central, regional and local levels, and 
in workplaces. They operate according to different logics and in numerous arenas, and 
their organizational strength and influence are greater than their memberships (never-
theless substantial) would lead one to believe. 
This has been the outcome of the unions’ considerable capacity for adaptation, 
facilitated both by their original horizontal-vertical organization and by the largely in-
formal normative context in which they continue to operate. But it has also been the 
outcome of a shift to more inclusive action, whereby, with different nuances and em-
phases, representation is not simply understood as protection of members in the strict 
sense, but accommodates a further extension of the unions’ range of action. Illuminat-
ing in this regard is the endeavour by the confederations to shed their traditional in-
dustrialist image by describing themselves as the union of ‘citizens’ (in the case of the 
Uil), the union ‘of rights’ (in the case of the Cgil) or the union ‘of autonomy’ (in the 
case of the Cisl).  
In light of what has been said, not only is it misleading to attribute the weak fea-
tures of a Mediterranean or southern European model to Italian trade unionism, it 
seems also quite inappropriate to frame discussion of the Italian case within the cur-
rent debate on union ‘revitalization’ (Wallerstein et al., 1997; Wever, 1998; Turner et 
al., 2001; Frege & Kelly, 2004). The main issues are other than how trade unionism 
can be ‘revitalized’. 
Setting aside the problems and dilemmas common to all unions, the first of these 
issues is how to give greater stability to a system which, despite recent progress (the 
interconfederal agreement of June 2011), is still characterized – at least at the time of 
writing, in December 2012 – by the lack of a minimum of shared procedural rules. In 
a context of competitive pluralism, this enduring indeterminacy as regards the meas-
urement of representativeness and the criteria for decision-making continues to favour 
the unions’ oscillation between behaving as organizations or social movements ac-
cording to convenience and to pressures applied by the rank and file.  
It should also be added, however, that it is probably due to these characteristics 
of Italian trade unionism that social protest – as in the case of the recent demonstra-
tions against austerity measures to cope with the economic crisis – finds less expres-
sion than elsewhere in uncontrolled and sometimes violent movements, or in sensa-
tional acts of individual protest. 
A second unresolved issue, connected to the first, concerns relationships among 
the unions. The ideological cleavages among the three confederations, not to mention 
their differences with the autonomous unions, have always impeded relations among 
them, as well as with their rank and files. Today the original ideological distinctions, 
which paralleled those among the old political parties, are obsolete and largely incom-
prehensible especially to young people. On the other hand, the identity incentives de-
riving from connection with the different visions on how to change and improve soci-
ety, have constituted, and to some extent still do, an important resource for develop-
ment of the militancy that the unions need, and more generally for their resilience and 
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reproduction over time. The point in this case is finding ways to preserve the funda-
mental values of each organization without prejudicing cooperation among them, and 
with a view to their eventual reunification. 
A third issue is how to set order on initiatives which are sometimes redundant 
and show a poor ability to learn from past experience. This is largely due to the low 
level of institutionalization: indeed, the scant structuring and formalization of action 
gives rise to wearisome repetitions and to a constant need to start again from scratch. 
But it also favours positive experimentation and innovation. The point is therefore 
how to find ways to build, with greater awareness and without excessive waste, on the 
wealth of past experience without prejudicing the capacity to innovate. This highlights 
the need to introduce assessment and monitoring into the system. 
A final, and fundamental issue is how to devise strategies to represent what is by 
now a highly diversified labour force. The broader the range of specific interests rep-
resented (based on gender, age, type of employment relationship, provenance, job 
grade, or skill level), the more difficult it becomes simply to add a new protection or a 
new provision to those that already exist. It is instead necessary to establish priorities 
or to retrench, or better reconfigure, the previous set of protections. The point – we 
may say – is extending ‘light’ protection to cover all workers, rather than providing 
‘heavy’ protection for only some of them. But moving decisively in this direction may 
also entail a radical reorganization of the unions’ structure and logic of action.  
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